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Sufian Abu Zaida: “Trying to fix things only made them worse”—his statements have harmed both himself and the Fatah Reformist Current, while raising suspicions.

Sufian Abu Zaida: “Trying to fix things only made them worse”—his statements have harmed both himself and the Fatah Reformist Current, while raising suspicions.

Sufian Abu Zaida’s statements regarding the message he claims to have conveyed from Yahya Sinwar to the Israeli side prior to October 7, 2023, were expected to shed significant light on the communications preceding the attack—and perhaps offer insight into events during the final weeks before that date.

However, the manner in which he presented the details and elaborated on his role—coupled with his disclosure that he informed Mohammed Dahlan and Samir al-Mashharawi of the exchange—has raised a series of political questions that had not previously been posed so clearly.

According to Abu Zaida’s account, he met with Yahya Sinwar on September 14, 2023—roughly three weeks before October 7. Sinwar asked him to convey a message to the Israelis warning of an impending “earthquake” and insisted that the message be relayed verbatim. Abu Zaida states that he carried out this request and that the Israeli side promptly contacted him, seeking an urgent meeting the following day.

This is where the real questions arise.

Was Abu Zaida merely an intermediary regarding the prisoner file, or did his role extend beyond that?
If his account is accurate, it implies that an indirect channel of communication between Hamas and Israel had been active for over a year, with Palestinian figures from outside Hamas acting as intermediaries to relay messages between the two sides. However, the most politically significant aspect is that Abu Zayda himself states he informed the leadership of the Fatah Democratic Reform Current—represented by Mohammed Dahlan and Samir Mashharawi—about the content of the meeting with Sinwar.

This specific detail elevates the issue beyond Abu Zayda as an individual, implicating the image of the faction to which he belongs and raising questions that demand clear, transparent answers: What exactly did the faction know? When did they know it? What did they do with this information? And was there any follow-up regarding the message or the preceding communications?

The problem is that, in attempting to defend his own account, Abu Zayda may have raised more questions for himself and the Fatah reformist faction than he resolved.

As details emerge, the need for answers grows: Why did this channel remain active? Who was aware of it? What were the limits of the mediators’ roles? And what were the various Palestinian parties told?

In politics, the claim “I was merely a messenger” is insufficient when the message originates from a Hamas leader just weeks before an event that transformed the entire region. What is required is documentation of the communication timeline, identification of those who were aware of it, and a determination of whether any actions were taken based on the information received.

Ultimately, Abu Zayda’s account remains a personal narrative requiring independent verification of its details, even if certain elements have already been covered by various Israeli and Arab media outlets.

Politically, the issue has shifted from a mere discussion about “Sinwar’s message” to a genuine test of transparency for all parties connected to these back-channels.

Far from concluding with a single answer, the story appears to have opened the door to a much broader set of questions. The most important question now is not merely: What did Sinwar say to Israel? Rather: Who knew what prior to October 7, and what did they do with that information?

‏التاريخ 4-10-2026

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